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The Persisting Past of Iraq
Peace and stability are high priorities for Iraq today. Yet to be  
effective, engagements for peace need to consider the complex  
interaction between Shiite and Sunni cleavages, tribal dynamics,  
and regional/international influences. Such dynamics cross  
state and non-state levels, exemplified by Iran’s regional influence
on Iraqi actors at all levels.
By Mae Anna Chokr
Since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 
and the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, 
the central state of Iraq became much 
weaker and more fragmented. It is charac-
terized by high levels of corruption, dys-
functional oversight mechanisms and lim-
ited political and judicial accountability. 
Non-state actors have benefited from the 
power vacuum of the central state and have 
also aligned with different regional actors 
– namely Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and 
Turkey. Iraq consists of a rich and ethni-
cally diverse history despite its major sec-
tarian fault lines. According to the World 
Population Review 2021 Iraq today con-
sists of approximately 75 per cent Arabs, 17 
per cent Kurds and a further eight per cent 
of other minorities. While the Constitu-
tion guarantees the freedom of religious 
beliefs, Islam is the official religion of Iraq, 
with believed estimates of 65 per cent Shi-
ites and 35 per cent Sunnis. 
With a predominantly Shiite population, 
neighboring Iran plays a particularly influ-
ential role in Iraq. Over the years, attention 
has focused on the presence of religiously 
affiliated armed groups operating at the core 
of Iraq’s politics, in particular, networks such 
as the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU). 
The PMU are an umbrella of armed groups. 
Shiite fighters form most of the PMU bri-
gades, some of these are aligned with Irani-
an interests and have penetrated Iraqi gov-
ernment institutions. For example, to retain 
the political status quo, Iran-allied actors in 
Iraq such as the PMU may seek to shape 
Iraq’s parliamentary elections, such as the 
upcoming ones scheduled for October 
2021. This has reinforced the Shiite-Sunni 
sectarian cleavage and has further under-
mined the independence of Iraqi central 
state, its institutional capacity as well as 
challenging any ongoing conflict resolution 
efforts. Yet the PMU has only been able to 
do this and gained such traction in Iraq as 
they were seen as a key counter insurgency 
actor during the war against the so-called 
Islamic State (IS), which propagates an ex-
tremist Sunni narrative and that also spans 
international borders. At the same time, 
Tribal leaders attend a meeting over tensions in ethnically and religiously mixed northern cities of Iraq. 
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tribal affiliations still remain influential in 
Iraq, and these sometimes also cross the 
Sunni-Shiite cleavage or divide.
At the international level, different actors 
have different stakes in the region. The 
E3+3 (France, Germany, United Kingdom, 
China, Russia and the United States), for 
instance continue to focus their efforts on 
limiting Iran’s nuclear threat by trying to 
re-establish the Iran nuclear agreement 
known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action ( JCPOA), which the US unilater-
ally left in 2018 under the Trump admis-
tration. While many view that the overall 
the nuclear issue should be connected to 
Iranian engagement in the region, Tehran 
categorically rejects such efforts. Hence, 
Iran maintains its regional influence 
through its proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Ye-
men, and Syria. 
While such dynamics have challenged 
conflict resolution activities, international 
efforts adopting a local-oriented approach 
may enhance peace and stability in Iraq. 
This approach includes building partner-
ships with national authorities through or-
ganizational capacity building (see textbox 
p. 2). Any effort at working towards stabil-
ity and peace in Iraq today, however, needs 
to reckon with the long shadow of the past 
in Iraq. Three dimensions seem especially 
important to keep in mind both in under-
standing the past and dealing with the 
present: the Shiite-Sunni sectarian cleav-
age; tribal dynamics; and the role and in-
terference of regional as well as interna-
tional actors. 
A deeper understanding along these three 
dimensions can help international actors 
with formalized bilateral relations improve 
chances for facilitating durable dialogue 
processes amongst local actors in Iraq. 
While exploring the interaction between 
these dimensions, it is helpful to focus es-
pecially on the role and relations of the fol-
lowing actors: the prime minister’s office, 
religious actors including the Shiite reli-
gious authority, the PMU, tribal networks, 
and regional/international actors. The in-
terrelationship between these actors is ex-
pressed through loyalties, alliances, opera-
tional capacity, and legitimacy on local, 
national, and regional levels.
Sectarian Narratives
Narratives or “stories” give insight into an 
actor’s values, interests and how an actor 
gives meaning to events and develops its 
political discourse. Narratives often legiti-
mize political actions, even if they do not 
shape them in a deterministic way. In Iraq, 
sectarian narratives shape the political Shi-
ite-Sunni cleavage. 
Sectarian narratives are often related to 
group-forming processes. Once individuals 
form themselves into groups based on 
shared religious affiliations and stories, 
they often create a cohesive bloc or confes-
sional sect. The political-cultural-religious 
overlaps of these groups are often rein-
forced and conveyed through religious lan-
guage, shared stories and symbols. Often it 
also requires either an institutional backing 
such as by a religious authority or a charis-
matic leader carrying a form of legitimacy. 
Furthermore, such group-forming process-
es can also be shaped by informal and lo-
cal-level legitimizing processes and prac-
tices found in tribal customary codes (see 
textbox p. 3). 
Sectarian narratives can be conflict induc-
ing or re-enforcing, especially if they are 
politicized. Politicizing sectarian identities 
or group affiliations seem to contribute to 
the protraction of preexisting conflicts be-
tween local actors. Yet these very same nar-
ratives may also act as enablers for peace, as 
they may carry multiple interpretations 
and do not deterministically shape a spe-
cific political or military behavior. The Shi-
ite and Sunni narratives each have a spe-
cific historical genealogy and are 
represented by various stakeholders with 
overlapping interests. At the same time, it 
is important to keep in mind that the sec-
tarian lens is only one aspect or way of 
viewing the conflict. 
Shiite and Sunni Cleavages
The Shiites believes that the rightful suc-
cessor of the prophet Mohammad should 
remain in his direct lineage known as ahl al 
bayt. The largest Shiite branch adhere to 
what is known as the Twelver religious 
school of thought, which Iran’s official 
state religion also identifies with. This 
school believes in twelve imams of which 
the final imam, Mahdi, will appear at the 
“end of times”.
The PMU is mainly made of Shiite fighters 
who require the support of an institutional 
religious authority known as the Marjai-
yah, currently headed by Ayatollah Ali al-
Sistani. The Marajiyah operates on a na-
tional level and feeds into the sectarian 
narrative, by issuing religious endorse-
ments to armed groups such as the PMU. 
These endorsements or defense fatwas are 
based on Islamic jurisprudence to help se-
cure nationwide support.  
On a state level, the prime minister‘s office 
is the key power holder in the Iraqi federal 
government. The constitution of Iraq pro-
hibits the establishment of militia organi-
zations outside of the state’s official armed 
forces. Prior to current minister Mustafa 
Al-Kadhimi who assumed office in March 
2018, former minister Haider al-Abadi is-
sued a decree before the parliamentary 
elections, intending to redefine 
the PMU’s function in relation 
to the state. By July 2019, his 
successor Adil Abdul Mahdi 
had formally stipulated a decree 
stating the integration of the 
PMU into the state’s security 
apparatus. This organizational 
infrastructure would intend to transform 
the PMU into a reliable and easily deploy-
able emergency task force. Therefore, the 
PMU leaderships that are close to Iran 
have emphasized their loyalty to both Sis-
tani and partly the state military structure.
As a state-sanctioned organization, state-
ments that may accuse the PMU of com-
mitting human rights violations due to 
their militarization would directly affect 
the integrity of the Prime Minister’s Office. 
Today, the prime minister’s authority is in a 
fragile position as he attempts to consoli-
date a divided state of mistrusted partisan 
elites and regional and religious interfer-
ence. On the other hand, there are politi-
cally active Shiite groups such as the Peace 
Brigades or the Sadrist political party lead 
by Moqtada al Sadr, who represent them-
selves as a national stronghold of Arab 
Iraqi Shiites. Presently, as an Iraqi religious 
Local Oriented Peacebuilding
One approach to peacebuilding in contexts 
such as Iraq is to support local actors who can 
work across conflict cleavages. The multiplic-
ity of overlapping interests  and alliances 
– such as sectarian, tribal, and regional – may 
provide opportunities for collaboration in 
unyielding conflicts. Local actors who use 
such opportunities may help to manage 
conflict and minimize societal polarization. 
However, to be sustainable, a link to the 
national level is often necessary.
Any effort at working towards 
stability and peace in Iraq needs 
to reckon with the long shadow 
of the past.
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authority, the Marjaiyah is playing a role in 
steering away from polarization towards a 
more coherent national state based on citi-
zenship which is appealing to parties such 
as the Sadrists.
The second major religious group are the 
Sunnis. The name Sunni refers to “people 
of the tradition”, as it stresses the preva-
lence of the Sunnah – which refers to the 
practices of the Prophet Mohammad 
through four Islamic schools of thought. 
An important facet of Iraq is its historically 
complex tribal society in which the politi-
cization of Islam became intertwined with 
the sociological makeup of the country 
across time. Traditional tribal membership 
in Iraq is important for an individual in 
both Sunni and Shiite communities where 
they enjoy a degree of a locally formalized 
legitimacy without state interference. Sun-
ni Arabs are largely represented by tribes 
situated in northwestern provinces of Iraq 
who had felt sidelined after the US-led in-
vasion and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s 
Sunni-dominated regime.
One of the main interests for Sunni groups 
is their ability to maintain their social and 
political standing in state and non-state 
levels given the widespread Iran and Shiite 
influence. Consequently, the weakening 
and marginalization of the Sunni opposi-
tion has partly contributed to the mobiliza-
tion and recruitment of fighters into the IS.
Tribal Cleavages
While the 2005 ratified constitution of the 
Iraqi state is built on democratic principles, 
the state’s legitimacy is continuously chal-
lenged by the self-governance of commu-
nal cleavages. Tribes in Iraq have a semi-
autonomous nature and follow their own 
set of customary laws and other sub-identi-
ties. The politicization of sectarian dynam-
ics is often legitimized by these communal 
divisions. In turn, this reinforces communal 
representations and allows groups to play 
an active role in politics. Such develop-
ments prove to be complex, since political 
leaders and self-governed groups attempt 
to merge traditional and modern systems 
of governance. Nonetheless, a degree of 
territorial administrative autonomy plays a 
role in each of the Shiite, Sunni and Kurd-
ish provinces due to pre-existing loyalties 
that have contributed to the establishment 
of the provincial boundaries.
Based on different variables such as closer 
geographical proximity of Sunni and Shiite 
areas, tribal relations, or shared history all 
have direct influence on reconciliation or 
opposition between both sects. For that 
reason, tribal networks have played stabili-
zation roles and have shifted alliances de-
pending on personal interests. For example, 
Sunni tribes in Mosul in the north of Iraq, 
oppose Iranian influence while Sunni 
tribes in the Ramadi area in central Iraq are 
leaning towards reconciliation with Iran 
backed local leaders. Moreover, in 2016 the 
head of the PMU’s Commission Faleh al-
Fayyadh had publicized the presence of 
roughly 40,000 to 50,000 Sunni fighters 
within a registered brigade of the PMU 
known as the Tribal PMU. This displays 
the ability for tribes to bridge across the 
sectarian divide.
It is important to keep in mind that the 
tribal system represents a crucial social sys-
tem in the country, previous attempts at 
dismantling the tribal networks 
gravely destabilized the country 
and increased chances of armed 
conflict. For this reason, the 
Iraqi government continuously 
attempts to ensure that tribal loyalties, al-
legiances, and their affairs are taken into 
consideration to maintain social stability.
Regional and International Level 
In January 2020 a US drone assassinated 
one of the Iran’s leading figures Qassim 
Soleimani – the commander of the Quds 
Force, a division of the Islamic Revolution-
ary Guard Corps – as well as Iraq’s PMU 
chief of staff. This took place after the US 
Defense Department identified that Solei-
mani posed a threat on US personnel in 
Iraq and throughout the region. In addi-
tion, as one of the largest Sunni Arab 
countries, Saudi Arabia’s stark opposition 
against Iran’s competitive regional role has 
added to the local Sunni-Shiite tensions 
through indirect warfare. On a regional 
level, competing neighboring states sup-
port different internal rivals politically and 
militarily. 
The ongoing conflict between Sunni and 
Shiite Muslims in Iraq today is influenced 
by a historical rivalry between Iraq and 
Iran reflected across numerous accounts 
between Arabs and Persians. Their compe-
tition for regional political power is due to 
their close geography and shared history. 
For this reason, as opposed to Iranian loy-
alty, if Shiite groups in Iraq are empowered 
by their national or Arab identity this may 
trigger tensions on an intra Shiite level. 
More specifically between an “Arab Shiite 
vision” and an “Iranian Shiite vision” in Iraq 
on both local and national levels.  
How the Biden administration’s foreign 
policy will reflect onto Iran remains un-
clear, as several scenarios are at play. This 
includes potential results of the negotia-
tions in Vienna revisiting the JCPOA 
signed back in 2015. The lifting of sanc-
tions or in contrary further limitations on 
Iran will have a direct impact on regional 
proxies such as in Iraq. Due to pressures 
caused by the sanctions, Iran is dependent 
on Iraqi resources including capital and 
border access that allows smuggled resourc-
es to cross into Iran through Iraq, Lebanon, 
and Syria. However, unlike other regional 
proxies, the PMU is an organ of the state 
under the authority of the Prime Minister’s 
office in Iraq. This allows a degree of 
Customary Systems of Conflict Settlement
Ancient tribal law in Iraq comprises a sovereign 
and independent body of customary laws 
historically held by tribes.
The initial steps towards recognizing tribal law 
in the 20th century were first taken by Britain’s 
Tribal Disputes Act in 1916, which was then 
adopted in 1924 by King Faysal’s government, 
allowing tribal law to function in the Iraqi 
countryside.
Arbitration laws were established in 2018 as 
efforts of dialogue between the state and the 
tribes, where the Ministry of Justice in Iraq 
assembled a team to secure the safety and 
peace of communities across all provinces, 
through an appointed group of tribal 
arbitrators.
47 tribal leaders known as Al-awaref were 
selected by the Ministry of Interior to resolve 
disputes on a regular basis and to reduce the 
expansion of conflicts, with no salaries 
provided.
Tribal dispute resolution consists of a set of 
communal rituals of reconciliation. The 
communal gathering or diplomacy is 
traditionally carried out in the sheikh‘s house or 
the victim‘s house as a symbol of goodwill. The 
process of the settlement is named sulha in 
Arabic, in which a fasel, or a sum of money, is 
agreed upon as a price to pay for the damage of 
honor that has been caused.
Narratives may also act  
as enablers for peace.
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legitimacy and credibility within the Iraqi 
state alongside Sunni (and other) represen-
tatives in the government. The PMU’s link 
to the state could potentially provide Iraq a 
powerful role in conflict de-escalation do-
mestically and regionally, through the 
PMU networks as a common interlocutor.
Engagement for Peace and Stability 
Understanding sectarian dynamics in Iraq 
can help to inform efforts when addressing 
challenges over stability, peace, migration, 
humanitarian action and development. By 
recognizing existing sectarian dynamics and 
their respective stakeholders – as discussed 
above – the core issues on local, and nation-
al levels become more easily identifiable and 
conflict resolution efforts more contextual-
ized. Such efforts need to build on the in-
herent flexibility in sectarian narratives, the 
crossing of conflict cleavages and work to-
wards the development of mechanisms to 
deal with conflict nonviolently. This requires 
engaging with different actors and working 
towards inclusive and effective local and na-
tional governance systems. 
Moreover, conflicts may not only forcefully 
displace people, but also disproportionately 
affect children and female migrants. While 
many international actors focus on migra-
tion, understanding sectarian narratives, 
tribal dynamics and regional/international 
actors can help interpret reasons associated 
with refugee and humanitarian aid move-
ments. This can add to durable solutions 
and social protection assistance for dis-
placed persons. Additionally, the impact of 
conflict on the local infrastructure of Iraq 
has exacerbated water, land, and 
environment conditions in the 
last years, resulting in a lack of 
access to basic services. Devel-
opment is needed. Yet there is 
little or no incentive for private 
sector investment, given the lack of funding 
and the absence of electoral and judicial ac-
countability. Accordingly, localization strat-
egies can help the repair of infrastructure 
and improve services such as health, educa-
tion, treated water, nutritional supplements, 
sewage treatment and road repairs. 
Overall, religious authorities in Iraq carry a 
social and political weight capable of sway-
ing an outcome towards resolving conflict. 
Engaging with religiously inspired groups 
is therefore necessary, even if challenging. 
The development of an all-inclusive vision 
for Iraq and considering the state and non-
state levels and sources of legitimacy is key 
to peace and stability. For that reason, a re-
flection on why stories of the past continue 
to persist today can shed light on a way for-
ward. 
For more on perspectives on Mediation and 
Peace Promotion, see CSS core theme page.
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The tribal system represents a 
crucial social system in the  
country.
